Spirit
FROM PAGE
17
THE OTHER HALF OF THE ELEPHANT
Strangely enough, though, standard-setters
seem to get a half-glimpse of the elephant
from time to time because they continually
endorse asset impairments, which is nothing short of schizophrenic value-based accounting. Why are value decreases deemed
reliable enough to warrant recognition but
value increases are not?
We also point out the utter nonsense of
comparing an observed market value with a
fabricated (even random) book value to trigger a writedown. The explanation, of course,
is auditors’ dysfunctional stranglehold on
standard-setting. They jump at the chance
to force losses onto income statements, but
don’t want to stick their necks out by recognizing gains.
We look for ward to the day when auditors
will be held accountable (in court, if necessary) for their persistent negligence in blessing duh-preciation numbers that mislead users because they have absolutely no meaning
whatsoever.
DISPATCHING THE ELEPHANT
Policymakers are the only ones who can get
rid of duh-preciation and create more useful
accounting. However, they are figuratively using their ankuses to deal with small rodents,
instead of going after the obviously huge duh-preciation elephant.
Consider the brand-new exposure draft
on lease accounting that has been touted
as changing everything. It doesn’t live up to
that billing because it says that lessees must
duh-preciate their capitalized rights to use
the lessors’ property while lessors are to keep
duh-preciating their property, or at least the
amount left in their accounts.
The ability, responsibility, and, yes, the
public duty to turn duh-preciation and impairment accounting into full valuation based
on current measures of the assets’ market values lies squarely on the joint shoulders of the
Securities and Exchange Commission and
the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(the International Accounting Standards
Board has shown no inclination to tackle
this issue). We implore the commissioners
to instruct Chief Accountant Jim Kroeker to
elevate this elephant’s prominence so that
accountants will actually have to confront it.
This effort will involve asking FASB to grapple
with both the old way’s flaws (so they can be
eliminated) and the new way’s opportunities
(so they can be implemented).
GETTING STARTED
One transitional approach would require
supplemental reporting of readily available market values, most notably insured
amounts, but also others based on databases
and recent transactions. In fact, managers
and auditors could consult the same data
sources they rely on to determine whether
impairment has occurred.
Some 30-plus years ago, FASB tried this ap-
proach with SFAS 33 but mistakenly labeled
it an experiment; limited it to only the larg-
est companies; allowed loosey-goosey mea-
sures, including general price indexation;
and recommended that the measures be
unaudited. Understandably, users did not get
very excited because this solution was only
temporary, the information wasn’t provided
by all firms, the measures weren’t faithful
representations of value, and no one dared
trust the unaudited numbers. Managers also
choked the last bit of perceived usefulness
out of their disclosures with disclaimers that
warned everyone against relying on them.
THE TIME IS NOW
We think it’s long past time, maybe even by
180 years, for accounting to get real about
valuation, instead of continuing to claim that
bogus duh-preciation and impairment numbers are relevant and reliable when they are
neither. Now, SEC and FASB, reach down and
pick up the ankus that Sid Davidson dropped,
approach the large animal, and start poking
it toward the door, sending it off to the proverbial elephants’ graveyard where it should
have gone to die long, long ago.
While you’re at it, you need to do the same
with all the other accounting elephants lurking around the room, namely inventory, pensions, intangibles, R&D, current/noncurrent
classifications, cash flow statements, treasury
stock transactions, and deferred income taxes, to name a few. Doing anything less than
completely dispatching this herd will be a
dereliction of your joint duties to produce
useful statements that will make the capital
markets better informed and more efficient.
The same old excuses won’t take you off
this hook. AT